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PLAIN MEANING AND LINGUISTICS-A CASE
STUDY
MICHAEL S. MOORE*
Linguistics and law intersect in their common concern with semantics.
Linguists care about semantics because the meaning of words and sentences
is part of any plausible theory of how we communicate with one another.
Lawyers care about semantics because the (ordinary English) meaning of
words and sentences is part of any plausible theory of how judges should
interpret legal texts such as statutes.' Semantics is thus the locus of a
potentially fruitful co-operation between linguists and lawyers. Yet one of
the pervasive dangers in interdisciplinary work is that the urge to integrate
the insights of one discipline with the tasks of another often causes a
warping of the latter in order to make it more receptive to the proposed
integration. Such I fear is the case with the linguistics expertise proffered
to the United States Supreme Court recently, via an amicus brief by the
Law and Linguistics Consortium.z
The case was United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.' The interpretive
issue in X-Citement Video involved 18 U.S.C. § 2252, which provides that
"Any person who knowingly transports ... any visual depiction, if (A) the
producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such
conduct ... shall be punished . . . ."' The legal issue was whether an
accused must know not only that he is transporting a visual depiction in
order to be convicted under the act-must he also know that what he is
transporting depicts sexually explicit conduct by a minor?
Justice Scalia in his dissent would have that legal issue turn on the
* Leon Meltzer Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania. B.A.
University of Oregon (1964); J.D. (1967), S.J.D. (1978) Harvard Law School. My thanks go to Georgia
Green and to Jeff Kaplan for their detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper.
I. For a separation of semantics and pragmatics, and a discussion of the place of the former in
an overall theory of statutory and constitutional interpretation, see Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law
Theon, oflnterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277 (1985).
2. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Law and Linguistics Consortium in Support of Respondents,
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994) (No. 93-723).
3. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994). The case was one of our
problems at the symposium. See Problems, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 795, 796-97 (1995).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1982).
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linguistic question of whether, according to ordinary English syntax, the
adverb "knowingly" could be said to modify clauses (A) and (B) following
the word "if." Scalia, finding "the only grammatical reading" of section
2252 to be one whereby "knowingly" does not modify these clauses,'
would have interpreted the statute so that knowledge that the sexually
explicit conduct of a child was depicted would not be required for
conviction.
Let me creep up on the linguistic issue (that Scalia finds determinative
of the legal issue in X-Citement Video) by stepping back to some more
general concerns. Notice that section 2252, like most criminal statutes,
requires that some of its words do double duty. Take "transports... any
visual depiction."6 To be guilty under this statute, a defendant must
actually do some transporting of some visual depictions. This is part of the
actus reus requirement for this statute.
The actus reus requirement is satisfied if and only if: (a) the defendant
did some sort of action, which on my theory of action requires that the
actor successfully willed a movement of his body; and (b) the willed bodily
movement in question has the causal or other properties required to
instantiate the type of action, transporting visual depictions.' Secondly, that
defendant must think of the action he is doing as being describable as
"transporting visual depictions." The actor must represent what he is doing,
in other words, under the description, "transporting visual depictions." this
is part of the mens rea requirement of this statute. A defendant satisfies this
mens rea requirement independently of satisfying the actus reus require-
ment; that is, just because a defendant does an act that amounts to a
transporting of a visual depiction does not mean that is how he represents
his act to himself, and conversely, even if a defendant did no act of
transporting he may well represent some act of his as a transporting of a
visual depiction, and this will satisfy the mens rea requirement.
This usage of the same words to do double duty is not an invention of
the law. In ordinary, idiomatic English we often collapse statements like,
"Jones transported a visual depiction while he knew that he was transport-
ing a visual depiction," into the shorter, "Jones knowingly transported a
visual depiction." Legislators are like other users of idiomatic English in
5. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 473.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1982).
7. On the actus reus requirement of criminal statutes, and its separation from the mens rea
requirement of those statutes, see MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION FOR CRIMINAL LAW 169-77 (1993).
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this respect, so that they often write criminal statutes preferring the shorter
version.
What is crucial here is to see that this familiar ordinary and legal usage
is elliptical in the way that the longer phrasing is not. An ellipsis occurs
when one collapses two different senses of the same word into one usage,
as in: "Both bad comedians and our mothers bore us." Since "bore" has
two distinct senses, and since both senses are meant in the quoted
statement, the statement is an ellipsis for: "Bad comedians bore us, and our
mothers bore us"-where each sense of "bore" is represented by its own
separate use of the word "bore." Such longer paraphrases of elliptical
statements are essential if we are to grasp their meaning, for no language
can be truth conditional if the terms in its statements are irreducibly dual
in their reference.
Since the multi-vocality of "transports a visual depiction" is not nearly
so obvious as the above usage of "bore," let me be as clear as possible
about the two distinct referents of the phrase.' When used as part of the
statute's actus reus requirement, the phrase refers to a type of action, an
abstract universal. Any act-token9 done by a particular defendant at a
particular time that instantiates this type of action will satisfy this part of
the actus reus requirement of the statute. When used as part of the mens
rea requirement, by contrast, the phrase refers to a way of representing or
describing this type of action, not (or at least, not directly) to the type of
action itself.'" What is thus required to satisfy the mens rea requirement
of this statute is not that the defendant do a particular act-token that
instantiates this act-type; nor is it even that the defendant believe that he
is doing that very act-token; rather, the defendant must represent to himself
that very act-token in the way required by the statute. He must think of the
act he knows himself to be doing under the representation, "transporting
visual depictions.""
8. I use "refer" and "referent" rather broadly, to include predicates and their extensions, and not
simply singular terms and their denotations.
9. Act-token is a term of art for particular acts that people do; the contrast is with act-types,
which are not spatio-temporally located particulars but are rather abstract universals. "Killing another
person" is an act-type; "Jones' killing of Smith yesterday" is an act-token. For further discussion of the
distinction, see Moore, supra note 7, at 80-81.
10. A great deal of philosophically complicated and controversial detail is glossed here. For an
introduction, see Michael S. Moore, Foreseeing Harm Opaquely, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL
LAW 125 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993).
11. Because knowledge of law is not required for a defendant to have mens rea, an accused's
mistakes of legal interpretation (as opposed to mistakes of non-linguistic fact) do not prevent him from
having the mens rea required by criminal statutes. This means that the criminal law's mens rea
1995] 1255
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This dual reference (to a type of action, and to a representation of that
type of action) by the same bit of language is easily missed if one focusses
on the surface grammar of the statutory sentence. For it might seem that
"transports... any visual depiction" refers univocally to a type of action,
and that the adverb "knowingly" picks out a this type of action. In such a
case "knowingly" would function like "slowly": both adverbs would narrow
the type of action to which the statute refers, but they would not require a
construction whereby "transports... any visual depiction" elliptically
refers to two different sorts of things.
However, this analogy to standard uses of adverbs like "slowly" cannot
be true of mental state terms like "knowingly." Since philosophers of action
have considered this point mostly with regard to another apparent adverb,
"intentionally," let me pursue the point with this example. In an important
paper on the "logical structure" of English sentences describing actions,
Donald Davidson years ago urged that it was only a "superficial grammar"
that would treat "intentionally" as an adverb.'2 The true grammar
(Davidson's "logical structure") of such sentences was different. He found
it to be "obvious ... that the adverbial form must be in some way
deceptive; intentional actions are not a class of actions, or, to put the point
a little differently, doing something intentionally is not a manner of doing
it."' Contrast this with the true adverb, "slowly." To drive slowly is a
way of driving (as it is to drive awkwardly, hastily, stupidly, dangerously,
etc.). Slow driving is a subtype of the act-type, driving. But intentionally
driving is not.
According to Davidson, this is because "to say someone did something
intentionally is to describe the action in a way that bears a special relation
to the beliefs and attitudes of the agent... "14 Davidson's point is better
put this way: to say someone did some action A intentionally is to say two
quite distinct things: it is to say that that actor in fact performed an action
accurately described (by the speaker, in retrospect) as an A-ing; and it is
to say that A-ing was one of the descriptions of that action under which the
actor represented his act to himself as he acted.
requirement is satisfied by mental states whose content consists of representations somewhat removed
from the precise language of the statute in question. A defendant who believes that he is transporting
a video tape but does not believe that video tapes are a kind of visual depiction, represents his action
as a transporting of visual depictions for purposes of the criminal law.
12. DONALD DAvIDSON, On the Logical Form of Action Sentences, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND
EVENTS 106 (1980).
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Consider Davidson's example, the action of Oedipus in seeking the
slayer of Laius (who, unbeknownst to Oedipus, is himself). 5 If we were
simply describing the action of Oedipus, without characterizing it as having
been done intentionally or knowingly, then we might equally well describe
the action as:
(1) Oedipus sought the slayer of Laius, or (2) the slayer of Laius sought
the slayer of Laius. As descriptions of the action, these are equally
accurate, because "Oedipus" and "the slayer of Laius" are two equally
accurate expressions for picking out the very same person, Oedipus. But
what Oedipus did intentionally or knowingly is not equally well described
by (1) and (2). As Davidson enigmatically puts it: "It was intentional of
Oedipus, and hence of the slayer of Laius, that Oedipus sought the slayer
of Laius [description (1) above], but it was not intentional of Oedipus (the
slayer of Laius) that the slayer of Laius sought the slayer of Laius
[description (2) above]."' 6 What is done intentionally is a description of
what is done that is in some sense peculiarly the actor's own description.
Since Oedipus did not represent his action as the seeking of a slayer by the
very same slayer, that is not what he did intentionally or knowingly
(although that is what he in fact did).
The upshot is that "knowingly" never functions like a true adverb. It is
misleading (even if idiomatic) English to say that someone knowingly or
intentionally did some action of type A. Such constructions should be
analyzed as we should analyze the much less idiomatic "adverbalization"
of other mental state verbs such as "desire" or "believe." Statements such
as, "Jones did A desiringly," or "Smith did A believingly," are deviant
usages. The meaning they should be assigned is that the actors did A, and
that they desired to A, or believed that they were A-ing, as the case may
be. Analogously, statements that one knowingly did some action A have to
be paraphrased to the dual statements the one A3d and that one knew one
was A-ing. It is a defect in ordinary English that "knowingly" does not
sound as deviant as is "believingly" or "desiringly," but the analysis of all
such purported adverbs should not differ.
There are thus two interpretive questions for the very same language of
section 2252, as for all criminal statutes requiring a mens rea of knowl-
edge: (1) what type of action is prohibited; and (2) what representations of
that action must the defendant have had in mind as he did the type of
15. DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 122, 127.
16. Id. at 122.
1995] 1257
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action prohibited? X-Citement Video becomes easier if we take these
interpretive issues one at a time, even though only the second is explicitly
at issue in the case.
If we focus on the actus reus requirement only, we can drop the adverb
"knowingly." We should now regiment the statutory sentence so as to
separate the operative facts from the legal remedy. 7 This we do by
replacing the verb "to be" with the "if... then" form. Our regimentation
is then:
(1) If [any person transports any visual depiction, if (the producing of
such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct and such visual depiction is of such conduct)], then that
person shall be punished.
Doing this reveals that the second "if' cannot be construed to create a
second logical relationship in addition to that created by the first "if' in (1).
To see this, replace "transports any visual depiction" with "A," replace "the
producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct and such visual depiction is of such conduct" with
"B," and replace "that person shall be punished" with "C." We may
represent the sentence as:
(2) If [A if B,] then C.
This is equivalent to:
(3) If (if B, then A) then C.
Yet if we give both "if s" the reading they have in logic (of the material
conditional), then (3) is equivalent to:
17. "Operative facts" was Hohfeld's term for those facts that some legal rule made dispositive of
the appropriateness of some legal remedy. W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919).
The fact that someone was negligent, for example, is an operative fact in tort law because that fact
(together with certain others) justifies the application of tort damages. The idea of regimenting sentences
is a philosphical one. See W. V.0. QuNE, WORD AND OBJECr (1960); and DAVIDSON, supra note 12,
at 137-46. Briefly, the idea is that some nuances of usage have to be ignored if we are to systemetize
in the way demanded by some theory. In contemporary philosophy, that theory has been a theory of
truth and of logic that demands a truth-conditional semantics. In contemporary legal philosophy a more
specific regimentation of legal utterances is demanded in order to exhibit the logical structure of legal
reasoning. Paraphrasing all authoritative legal utterances into the "if ... then ... " form of a
hypothetical imperative is one way to do this. For an example, see NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL
SYSTEMS AND LEGAL REASONING ch. II (1978). For the best known advocacy of the view that all legal
norms are to be recast into hypothetical imperatives directing judges in the use of legal sanctions, see
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 63 (1945).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/27
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(4) If (A or not-B), then C.
Sentence (4) says that someone should be punished if either they transport-
ed a visual depiction or the producing of a visual depiction involved the
use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and such visual
depiction was of such conduct. That is an absurd reading of section 2252,
for on such a reading one could be punished without doing any transport-
ing. Section 2252 plainly requires both that one transport a depiction and
that the depiction transported be of sexually explicit conduct of a minor.
The structure of the actus reus requirement of section 2252 is thus not that
given by (3) and (4); rather, it is:
(5) If (A and B), then C.
The second "if' in (1) and (2) is misleading insofar as it suggests that there
is a conditional relationship between A and B; the statute's structure is
better revealed when the second "if' is replaced with the conjunctive,
"and."
This is the same sort of regimentation we perform on English sentences
such as, "If you go downtown-if you are not angry-you may have an
ice-cream." To get our grouping indicators correctly placed, we paraphrase
to: "If (you go downtown and you are not angry), then you may have an
ice-cream." In such cases we treat the second "if' as creating a conditional
relationship, but not between A and B; rather, the second "if' only makes
clear the extended scope of the first "if," so that the conditional relationship
extends between (A and B) and C.
On this point, I think that I and the present views of the Law and
Linguistics Consortium are in rough agreement. The Consortium presently
construes the second "if' as introducing a parenthetical expression and
denies that that "if' creates a genuine conditional. This is fine, so long as
one recognizes that there is nonetheless a genuine logical relation between
A and B, even though not a conditional relation. There is no permissible
reading of § 2252 under which an accused could be punished if the visual
depiction he transported did not involve a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct. Such involvement is a necessary condition of punishability
under any conceivable reading of this statute. Therefore, a conjunctive
logical relation between A and B must be created by the second "if' in
§ 2252.
Now focus on the mens rea requirement embedded in section 2252.
Given the double duty of the language, one should start where we started
with the actus reus requirement, by regimenting the statute into an
12591995]
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"if... then" form so as to separate the operative facts from the legal
remedy.
This gives us:
(la) If [any person knowingly transports any visual depiction, if (the
producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct and such visual depiction is of such conduct)], then
that person shall be punished.
Let "K" stand for "knowingly." If we were to take the second "if' again to
create a true conditional relationship, then we get:
(2a) If [K (A) if B], then C
This, again, is equivalent to both:
(3a) If [if B, then K (A)], then C.
And
(4a) If [K (A) or not-B], then C.
(4a) is just as absurd as (4), for it would say that the mens rea requirement
was satisfied either if the defendant knowingly transported a visual
depiction or it was not the case that the depiction was that of a child
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
As before, the second "if' cannot be taken to create a conditional
relationship between B and K(A). It is the conjunctive, "and," that states
the mens rea requirement. This gives us:
(5a) If [K (A) and B], then C.
Yet once one sees that the second "if' does not name any truly
conditional relationship in addition to that implicit in all criminal statutes,
that "if' also loses any ability to act as a grammatical barrier to "knowing-
ly" modifying B as well as A. The mens rea requirement then could be:
(5b) If K [A and B], then C.
That is the way the majority of the Court in X-Citement Video construed
section 2252.
One might well object that an adverb like "knowingly" cannot modify
clauses (A) or (B) in section 2252 even if the "if' is replaced with an "and"
in the way I have suggested. If "knowingly" is used as a true adverb, the
objection would have force; for "knowingly... the producing of such
visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct" in truth -is pretty poor English. As an adverb, knowingly would be
[VOL. 73:1253
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modifying the verb, involves, yet the grammatical subject of involves does
not refer to a person who could know, but to an action (i.e., the producing)
that cannot know anything. However, as we have seen, the nominal adverb,
"knowingly," has to be paraphrased to its corresponding verb, "to know,"
anyway in order to eliminate the hidden ellipsis and to mark the distinction
between types of action done from representations by the actor of the types
of actions he is doing. So the nominally adverbial nature of "knowingly"
has to be discarded anyway, and cannot stand as a linguistic objection to
the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 2252. Once we make this
necessary paraphrase, the English is fine: "[K]nowing (or knows) that the
producing of such risual depiction involves the use of a minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct" is perfectly acceptable English, as is "knowing
(or knows) that such visual depiction is of such conduct."
I have presented the foregoing as an argument within semantics, a
subdiscipline within linguistics, as to how section 2252 should be read. In
truth, even if the semantics of section 2252 did not permit the reading of
the majority of the Supreme Court, the Court correctly interpreted section
2252 anyway. This is because semantics is only one ingredient in the
theory of statutory interpretation of any judge. Judges should also make use
of their moral knowledge in interpreting statutes, asking whether the
standard English meaning of some statutory sentence is too unjust to be
countenanced." In X-Citement Video, it would impose far too much strict
liability on a defendant if all he had to know was that he was transporting
a visual depiction of something. That the something depicted is sexually
explicit conduct of a minor is far too much the gravamen of the evil section
2252 seeks to prevent and to punish for that element to be left out of the
mens rea required for conviction. In the interests of justice, the Court had
good reason to construe section 2252 as it did.
It is, of course, more difficult for a court to use its moral knowledge to
overrule the ordinary meaning of statutory words than it is for a court to
use its moral knowledge to pick between different but equally acceptable
ordinary meanings. The main burden of this short comment is to indicate
why the Court did not have to make the greater showing necessary to
overrule the ordinary meaning. For despite Justice Scalia, and despite the
aid given him by the Law and Linguistics Consortium, the ordinary
meaning of section 2252's sentences do not make difficult the morally
18. See Moore, supra note I, at 383-88; Michael S. Moore, The Semantics ofJudging, 54 S. CAL.
L. REv. 151, 277-81 (1981).
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desirable reading.
I am aware that many academics in linguistics will resist this conclusion.
To the extent such resistance is not based on a flat disagreement with my
linguistic analysis, it is probably based on an unwillingness to call my
analysis "linguistic." For I twice heavily regimented the actual language of
section 2252 into something else, and some might think that this is not
linguistics but social policy at work. Yet such regimentation is an essential
part of any fruitful linguistic analysis. One cannot analyze the meaning of
language independently of views about the facts such language could be
about. If one believes as I do that mental states have propositional content,
that act-tokens are those spatio-temporally located particulars that we call
events, and that act-types are abstract universals that are not identical to
either act-tokens or to propositions about them, then one is driven to the
linguistic conclusion that constructions using "knowingly" or "intentionally"
are always elliptical and that paraphrase to the corresponding verbs is
always required. If one believes as I do that judges when interpreting
criminal statutes must always take such statutes to be directions to judges
to sanction the behavior such statutes prohibit, and also believes that judges
use standard deductive logic in applying such statutes to particular cases,
then one is driven to the linguistic conclusion that all criminal statutes must
be paraphrased into conditional statements with the operative facts in the
antecedent clause and the description of the remedy in the consequent
clause. These systematic regimentations I would call part of linguistics, and
the results of doing them, part of the ordinary or plain meaning of the
statute in question. That is what allows me to say that the morally desirable
reading of section 2252 is also a linguistically permissible reading.
Whatever one wants to call such analyses, they are certainly not part of the
moral enquiry into whether or not it is fair to convict someone who lacks
knowledge of some material elements of the actus reus. Judges attached to
plain meaning interpretive methods thus have no reason to eschew such
analyses, fearful that it cuts into the legislative prerogative in the way (on
their view) that a moral analysis does.
[VOL. 73:1253
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